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INTRODUCTION
The international intellectual property system is on the brink of a
deepening crisis. Government officials, civil society groups, and
private parties are staking out opposing positions on a variety of issues
in an increasingly wide array of international venues. The issues range
from patented medicine to biodiversity and traditional knowledge, and
from digital content and webcasting to the harmonization of
procedural rules.
The results are increasingly dysfunctional:
acrimonious and unresolved clashes over substantive rules and values,
competition among international institutions for policy dominance,
and a proliferation of fragmented and incoherent treaty obligations
and nonbinding norms.
This ominous state of affairs has evolved fairly rapidly. The last
decade has seen a dramatic expansion of intellectual property
protection standards, both in their subject matter and in the scope of
the economic interests they protect. Advances in technology have
engendered demands for new forms of legal protection by businesses
and content owners. And with the adoption of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),1
nation states linked intellectual property rights to the world trading
system, creating new and robust enforcement opportunities at the
international and national levels. These interrelated developments
have made intellectual property rights relevant to a broad range of
value-laden economic, social, and political issues with important
human rights implications, including public health, education, food
and agriculture, privacy, and free expression.2
A recent wave of resistance to this rapid expansion of intellectual
property rights has brought the work of the World Trade Organization
1
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
2
For earlier analyses of these trends, see Peter Drahos, THE UNIVERSALITY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 19-23 (1998), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdf/drahos.pdf
(documenting
proceedings of panel discussion held by World Intellectual Property Organization in
collaboration with Office of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights); Laurence R.
Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 22 NETH. Q.
HUM. RTS. 167, 171-75 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Conflict or Coexistence]; Laurence R.
Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 26-45 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer,
Regime Shifting].
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(“WTO”) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
— the two most prominent international intellectual property
lawmaking venues — to a virtual standstill. In the WTO, issues
relating to compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceuticals; the
relationship among biodiversity, patents, and plant breeders’ rights;
and the protection of geographical indications have remained
unresolved for nearly four years.3 Negotiations in WIPO are faring
little better. Industrialized nations are pressing for new treaties
relating to substantive patent rules, audiovisual works, and
broadcasters’ rights. Developing countries and consumer groups have
countered with a “development agenda” that calls for a moratorium on
new treaty-making and instead demands that WIPO give greater
attention to public access to knowledge and to non-proprietary
systems of creativity and innovation. These conflicting forces have
essentially neutralized each other. Each side has blocked or delayed
its opponents’ proposals as debates over new rules and policies have
become increasingly contentious and mired in procedural formalism.4
With forward motion in the WTO and WIPO effectively stalled,
both proponents and opponents of intellectual property rights have
sought out greener pastures. Developing countries and their likeminded nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) allies have decamped
to more sympathetic multilateral venues — most notably the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), the Food and Agriculture
Organization, and the conferences of the Convention on Biological
Diversity — where they have found more fertile soil in which to grow
proposals that seek to roll back intellectual property rights or at least
3
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:
World
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 324-26
(2005); Scant Progress in GI Discussions, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva,
Switz.), Sept. 27, 2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-0928/WTOinbrief.htm#2; TRIPS Council Meeting Suspended in Effort to Meet Public Health
Deadline, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Mar. 16, 2005, available
at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-16/story1.htm.
4
See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Members Reach Compromise on Advancing Patent
Law Negotiations, 22 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Oct. 13, 2005) (“The United States
and a group of mainly developed countries have been at loggerheads since May 2003 .
. . over the future direction and scope of negotiations on WIPO’s proposed Substantive
Patent Law Treaty.”); Michael Warnecke, WIPO Fails to Reach Consensus on Including
Webcasts in Broadcasting Treaty, 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 599 (Sept.
30, 2005) (describing disputes over proposed broadcasting treaty).
For some commentators, this deadlock is a salutary result. See Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the
Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 312-13 (2004) (calling for
moratorium on additional international intellectual property lawmaking).
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eschew further expansions of the monopoly privileges they confer.
Developed countries and intellectual property owners, too, are leaving
the field, not for other multilateral organizations but for bilateral and
regional trade and investment treaties. The price these countries
demand for expanded market access and foreign investment is
adherence to intellectual property rules that equal or exceed those
found even in the most protective multilateral agreements.5
In this maelstrom of reaction, resistance, and regime shifting,
international human rights law is poised to become an increasingly
central subject of contestation. For more than a century, international
agreements have protected certain moral and material interests of
authors, inventors, and other intellectual property creators. Until very
recently, however, the conceptualization of these intellectual property
interests as internationally protected human rights was all but
unexplored.
Intellectual property has remained a normative
backwater in the burgeoning post-World War II human rights
movement, neglected by international tribunals, governments, and
legal scholars while other rights emerged from the jurisprudential
shadows.6
What little can be discerned about the intellectual property
provisions of human rights law reveals a concern for balance. Both the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR” or “the Covenant”) recognize the moral and material
interests of authors and inventors7 and the right “to enjoy the arts and

5
See Brian Knowlton, U.S. Plays It Tough on Copyright Rules, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 4, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/03/business/
iprtrade.php (“So determined is the United States to strengthen copyright and patent
protection that it is, in effect, exporting its own standards through free trade
agreements reached with countries or regions as diverse as Australia, Singapore and
Central America.”); see also Concerns Raised Over Access to Medicines Under Trade
Treaties, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Jul. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-07-14/story3.htm; GRAIN, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
IMPOSING TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON BIODIVERSITY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2005), http://www.grain.org/rights_files/TRIPS-plus%20table_September_
2005.pdf.
6
Recently, a few commentators have started to explore in detail specific facets of
the intersection between intellectual property law and human rights law, such as the
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression. See generally, COPYRIGHT
AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES (Jonathan Griffiths &
Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005); COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
— INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY — PRIVACY (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
7
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
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to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”8 These clauses
offer protection to creators and innovators and the fruits of their
intellectual endeavors. But they also recognize the public’s right to
benefit from the scientific and cultural progress that intellectual
property products can engender.
Without elaboration, however, these textual provisions provide only
a faint outline of how to develop human rights-compliant mechanisms
to promote creativity and innovation. They also invite governments
and activists on both sides of the intellectual property divide to use the
rhetoric of human rights to bolster arguments for or against revising
intellectual property protection standards in treaties and in national
laws.9 Without greater normative clarity, however, such “rights talk”10
risks creating a legal environment in which every claim (and therefore
no claim) enjoys the distinctive protections that attach to human
rights.11
The skeletal and under-theorized intellectual property provisions of
human rights law also leave critical questions unanswered. What, for
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 15(1)(b), (c),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter ICESCR] (recognizing right “to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author” and to “to enjoy the benefits
of scientific progress and its applications”).
8
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 27(1).
9
See, e.g., Tom Giovanetti & Merrill Matthews, Institute for Policy Innovation,
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, IDEAS, Sept. 2005, at 2, 2), available at
http://www.ipi.org (asserting that “IP protection has long been recognized as a basic
human right” and that those who “want to weaken IP protections” are advocating
“expropriation of others’ property” and engaging in “ironically, one of the most ‘antihuman rights’ actions governments could take”); Third World Network, Statement at
the Third Intersessional Intergovernmental Meeting (July 22, 2005),
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2005-July/000539.html (challenging assertion
that “IP rights have been recognized at human rights” as “a misreading of the existing
international conventions,” and that [t]he [ICESCR recognizes] rewarding intellectual
contribution but does not specifically mention ‘IP rights’”); see also Letter from Shari
Steele, Staff Attorney, Electronic Freedom Foundation, to WIPO Internet Domain
Name Process (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/
DNS_control/19981106_eff_wipo_dns.comments (“We believe that the provision of
Internet domain names is fundamentally a human rights issue, not an intellectual
property issue.”).
10
See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 14 (1991).
11
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality
Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984); John H. Knox, Beyond Human Rights:
Developing Private Duties Under Public International Law 17 (Sept. 1, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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example, is the relationship between the intellectual property clauses
of the UDHR and ICESCR and the remaining civil, political, social,
and economic rights enshrined in human rights pantheon? And how
do human rights law’s intellectual property rules interface with the
rules set out in multilateral agreements emanating from WIPO, the
WTO, and regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties?
These uncertainties — together with the deepening crisis facing the
international intellectual property system — highlight the need to
develop a comprehensive and coherent “human rights framework” for
intellectual property law and policy. The questions to be answered in
constructing such a framework are foundational. They include issues
as basic as defining the different attributes of the “rights” protected by
each system; whether relevant standards of conduct are legally binding
or only aspirational; whether such standards apply to governments
alone or also to private parties; and adopting rules to resolve
inconsistencies among overlapping international and national laws
and policies. A human rights framework for intellectual property
must also distinguish situations in which the two legal systems have
the same or similar objectives (but may employ different rules or
mechanisms to achieve those objectives), from “true conflicts” of goals
or values that are far more difficult to reconcile.12 Finally, the
framework must include an institutional dimension, one that
considers the diverse international and domestic lawmaking and
adjudicatory bodies in which states and non-state actors generate new
rules, norms, and enforcement strategies.
This Article offers a preliminary foray into these novel and complex
issues. Part I begins with a brief overview of the textual and historical
foundations of the intersections between human rights and intellectual
property, focusing on the underlying legal and institutional factors
that have fomented recent conflicts between the two legal regimes.
Part II describes the genesis of those conflicts in greater detail,
focusing on the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional
knowledge and on the U.N. human rights system’s response to TRIPS
and bilateral and regional intellectual property treaties. Part III turns
to an analysis of two documents, recently drafted by the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which suggest a
partial and tentative outline of a human rights framework for
intellectual property. I use these documents to flesh out the
12
Cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 107 (1963) (distinguishing
between false conflicts, which “present no real conflicts problem” and “true conflicts,”
which “cannot be solved by any science or method of conflict of laws”).
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framework in greater detail and offer a preliminary approach for
mediating the two fields of law and policy. Part IV analyzes the
rapidly changing institutional environment in which new actors are
generating new legal rules relevant to the human rights-intellectual
property interface. I focus in particular on recent treaty-making
initiatives in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”), WHO, and WIPO, each of which uses
international human rights law in different ways to challenge existing
approaches to intellectual property protection and to revise the
mandates of intergovernmental organizations.
I.

THE TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

If asked to identify the freedoms and liberties protected as human
rights, even the most knowledgeable observers would be unlikely to
list the right of authors and inventors to protect the fruits of their
intellectual efforts. Yet such rights were recognized at the birth of the
international human rights movement. No less an august statement of
principles than the UDHR provides that “everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the
author.”13 The UDHR’s drafting history makes clear that the
protection of authors’ rights was no accident, even if the drafters’
precise intentions remain elusive.14 Support for these rights also finds
13

UDHR, supra note 7, art. 27(2).
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING AND INTENT 220-21 (1999). As one scholar recently observed, although the
motivations of governments who favored inclusion of article 27 in the UDHR are
somewhat obscure, the proponents appear to have been divided into two camps:
14

What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual property
was not properly speaking a Human Right or that it already attracted
sufficient protection under the regime of protection afforded to property
rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition of those who
primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral rights deserved
and needed protection and met the Human Rights standard and those who
felt the ongoing internationalization of copyright needed a boost and that
this could be a tool in this respect.
Paul Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 6, at 6. The intentions of the drafters of the analogous provisions of the ICESCR
seem equally obscure. See Maria Green, Int’l Anti-Poverty L. Ctr., Drafting History of
the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant, ¶¶ 41-43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15
(Oct.
9,
2000),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088?Opendocument (demonstrating that debates
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expression in nearly identical language in the ICESCR, an
international convention adopted nearly twenty years later that makes
the UDHR’s economic and social guarantees binding as a matter of
treaty law.15
Strikingly, human rights law’s inclusion of the rights of creators and
inventors has not been reciprocated in the international intellectual
property system. No references to “human rights” appear in
multilateral treaties such as the Paris,16 Berne,17 and Rome18
Conventions, nor do they appear in the more recently adopted TRIPS
Agreement. These treaties repeatedly describe the legal protections for
authors, inventors and other intellectual property owners as “rights,”
“private rights,” and “exclusive rights,”19 phrases that may appear to
suggest a commonality of objectives between the two legal regimes.
These linguistic and textual parallels are only superficial, however.
References to rights in intellectual property treaties serve distinctive
structural and institutional purposes. They help to demarcate the
treaties as charters of private rather than public international law,20
that is, as agreements that authorize individuals and businesses to
over intellectual property provisions of ICESCR focused on Cold War issues, and
concluding that Covenant’s drafters “did not seem to deeply consider the difficult
balance between public needs and private rights when it comes to intellectual
property,” and that “[w]hen the question was raised, they tended to dismiss it almost
out of hand”).
15
ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 15(1); see also Green, supra note 14, ¶¶ 7-46
(discussing drafting history of article 15(1)(c)).
16
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
17
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
18
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter Rome Convention].
19
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl. (“recognizing that intellectual property
rights are private rights”); Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 9(1) (“Authors of
literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right
of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.”); Paris
Convention, supra note 16, art. 2 (referring to “the rights specially provided for by
this Convention”).
20
See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 192 (2005) (stating
that “private international law has traditionally governed relationships and litigation
between private parties”). But see Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law
and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 520-21 (2005) (explaining ways in
which distinctions between public and private international law are artificial and
increasingly eroding).
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claim legal entitlements against other private parties in national courts
under national laws.21 In addition, use of “rights” language helps to
bolster claims of intellectual property owners in foreign legal systems
unfamiliar with or skeptical of the entitlements the treaties create for
non-nationals. The principal justifications for references to rights in
intellectual property agreements are thus grounded not in
deontological claims about the inherent attributes or needs of human
beings, but rather arise from efforts to realize the economic and
instrumental benefits of protecting intellectual property products
across national borders.
Although the references to rights in intellectual property law and
human rights law have distinct theoretical and philosophical roots, the
recent expansion of the two fields has blurred these distinctions in
new and unexamined ways. International relations scholars have
noted the tendency of international legal regimes to expand their
scope over time, creating dense “policy spaces” in which formerly
unrelated sets of principles, norms, and rules increasingly overlap in
incoherent and inconsistent ways.22 Such regime expansions are
especially pronounced in international intellectual property law and
international human rights law.
Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the development
of intellectual property protection rules occurred in a uni-modal
international regime confined to intellectual property-specific
diplomatic conferences and conventions. The focus of treaty-making
during this formative period was the gradual expansion of protected
subject matters and exclusive rights through periodic revisions to the
Berne, Paris, Rome, and other conventions.23 With the advent of
TRIPS in 1994, the regime entered into a bimodal phrase in which
rule-making
competencies
were
shared
between
two

21

This structural framework also helps to explain the assertion made by
international intellectual property scholars that there is “no international intellectual
property law per se; instead intellectual property rights are subject to the principle of
territoriality” and “vary according to what each state recognizes and enforces.”
Andrea Morgan, Comment, TRIPS to Thailand: The Act for the Establishment of and
Procedure for Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
795, 796 (2000) (collecting authorities).
22
See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 266 (Roger
B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
23
See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 84-133 (2d ed. 2006).
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intergovernmental organizations: WIPO and the WTO.24 By 2005,
however, the international intellectual property system had morphed
again, this time into a “conglomerate regime” or a “regime complex”
— a multi-issue, multi-venue, mega-regime in which governments and
NGOs shift norm creating initiatives from one venue to another within
the conglomerate, selecting the forum in which they are most likely to
achieve their objectives.25
The international human rights regime has exhibited similar
expansionist tendencies. Although the roots of human rights law date
back to the inter-war years, its full flowering first occurred in the years
following World War II. During this gestational period, government
officials, international bureaucrats, NGOs, and scholars were occupied
with foundational issues. Their most pressing goal was to elaborate
and codify legal norms and enhance international mechanisms for
monitoring compliance by nation states. As treaties, institutions, and
jurisprudence evolved, the regime developed a de facto separation of
human rights into categories. These categories ranged from a core set
of peremptory norms for the most egregious forms of misconduct, to
civil and political rights, to economic, social, and cultural rights.26
Economic, social, and cultural rights are the most expansive and, for
many countries, the most controversial. Whereas civil and political
rights are negative liberties that require government officials to refrain
from particular actions, economic, social, and cultural rights obligate
governments to provide minimum levels of subsistence and well-being
to individuals and groups. Achieving these goals requires affirmative
measures that often have significant financial consequences and
require difficult tradeoffs among competing categories of rights
holders and other claimants.27 These affirmative obligations also
24
See Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the
World Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996) (providing for joint
legal and technical assistance to developing countries and information between both
organizations).
25
See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 16-17.
26
See Helfer, Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 2, at 50-51.
27
For thoughtful recent discussions on achieving economic, social, and cultural
rights, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004); Mark Tushnet, Enforcing
Socio-Economic Rights: Lessons from South Africa, ESR REVIEW, Sept. 2005, at 2, 2,
available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Rights/
esr-review/esr-previous-editions/esrreviewsept2005.pdf; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare
Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/tushnet.pdf. For an earlier critical
analysis of economic and social rights, see Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in
WESTERN RIGHTS?: POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996).
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create broad areas of overlap — and of potential conflict — with
international intellectual property protection rules, as the next section
explains.
II.

INITIAL CONTESTATIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY

Two events catapulted intellectual property issues onto the agenda
of international human rights norm-creating bodies. The first was an
emphasis on the neglected cultural rights of indigenous peoples, and
the second was the linking of intellectual property and trade through
TRIPS and, more recently, bilateral and regional “TRIPS-plus”
treaties.28 These events exposed serious normative deficiencies of
intellectual property from a human rights perspective, and they
prompted new standard-setting initiatives which increased the
contestations between the two regimes.
A. The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge
Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.N. human rights system began
to devote significant attention to the rights of indigenous
communities.29 Among the many claims that these communities
sought from nation states was the right to recognition of and control
over their culture, including traditional knowledge relating to
biodiversity, medicines, and agriculture.
From an intellectual
property perspective, traditional knowledge was treated as part of the
public domain, either because it did not meet established subject
matter criteria for protection, or because the indigenous communities

28
These treaties are referred to as “TRIPS-plus” because they contain intellectual
property protection rules more stringent than those found in TRIPS, obligate
developing countries to implement TRIPS before the end of its specified transition
periods, or require such countries to accede to or conform to the requirements of
other multilateral intellectual property agreements. See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 791, 794-807 (2002),
available at www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/papers.htm (describing
TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements negotiated by United States and E.C. with individual
developing country governments); GRAIN, “TRIPS-PLUS” THROUGH THE BACK DOOR:
HOW BILATERAL TREATIES IMPOSE MUCH STRONGER RULES FOR IPRS ON LIFE THAN THE
WTO (2001) [hereinafter GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS], available at http://www.grain.org/
docs/trips-plus-en.pdf (same); OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM 111, 111-22 (2003), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/
e-book/2203031E.PDF (same).
29
See Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2001).
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who created it did not endorse private ownership rules.30 By treating
this knowledge as effectively un-owned, however, intellectual property
law made that knowledge available for exploitation by third parties, to
be used as an upstream input for later downstream innovations that
were themselves privatized through patents, copyrights, and plant
Adding insult to injury, the financial and
breeders’ rights.31
technological benefits of those innovations were rarely shared with
indigenous communities.32
U.N. human rights bodies sought to close this hole in the fabric of
intellectual property law by commissioning a working group and a
special rapporteur to create a Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples33 and Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of the Heritage of Indigenous People.34 These documents adopt a

30

See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 238 (2001) (“TK [traditional knowledge] is often (and
conveniently) assumed to be in the public domain. This is likely to encourage the
presumption that nobody is harmed and no rules are broken when research
institutions and corporations use it freely.”).
31
See LAURENCE R. HELFER, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 2-3 (2004).
32
See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUB-COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY
COUNCIL 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/2003/NGO/127 (2003):
The theft and patenting of Indigenous Peoples’ bio-genetic resources is
facilitated by [TRIPS]. Some of the plants which Indigenous Peoples have
discovered, cultivated, and used for food, medicine, and for sacred
ceremonies since time immemorial have already been patented in the United
States, Japan and Europe. A few examples of these are ayahuasca, quinoa,
and sangre de drago in South America; Kava in the Pacific; turmeric and
bitter melon in Asia.
There are some exceptions, however, particularly in the form of so-called
bioprospecting agreements between indigenous groups and entities in the developed
world. For a discussion of these agreements, see Charles R. McManis, Intellectual
Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally,
Acting Locally (Univ. of Washington Occasional Papers No. 1, 2003).
33
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
34
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26, Annex 1 (June 21, 1995) (initial text draft of Principles and
Guidelines); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Report of the Seminar on the Draft Principles and
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decidedly skeptical approach to intellectual property protection. On
the one hand, the documents urge states to protect traditional
knowledge using legal mechanisms that fit comfortably within existing
intellectual property paradigms — such as allowing indigenous
communities to seek injunctions and damages for unauthorized uses.35
But the documents also define protectable subject matter more broadly
than existing intellectual property laws, and they urge states to deny
patents, copyrights, and other exclusive rights over “any element of
indigenous peoples’ heritage” that does not provide for “sharing of
ownership, control, use and benefits” with those peoples.36 In short, a
human rights-inspired analysis of traditional knowledge views
intellectual property as one of the problems facing indigenous
communities, and, only perhaps, as part of a solution to those
problems.
B. The TRIPS Agreement, “TRIPS-Plus” Treaties, and Human Rights
The second area of intersection between human rights and
intellectual property relates to the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and “TRIPSplus” treaties.37 TRIPS adopted relatively high minimum standards of
protection for all WTO members, including many developing and least
developed countries with little previous interest in protecting patents,
copyrights, and trademarks.38 In addition, unlike previous intellectual
property agreements, TRIPS has teeth. It is linked to the WTO’s
dispute settlement system in which states enforce treaty bargains

Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000) (revised text of draft Principles and Guidelines). The
Sub-Commission later adopted the Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines and
transmitted them to the Commission for its approval. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Decision
2000/107, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/DEC/107/2000/107 (2000).
35
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot.
Human Rights, Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines, Guidelines § 23(b) [hereinafter
ESOSOC, Revised Draft] (providing that national laws to protect indigenous peoples’
heritage should provide means for indigenous peoples to prevent and obtain damages
for “the acquisition, documentation or use of their heritage without proper
authorization of the traditional owners”).
36
ESOSOC, Revised Draft, Guidelines § 23(c).
37
See TRIPS, supra note 1; GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS, supra note 28.
38
For a review of the changes TRIPS wrought, see J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS
Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 445-56 (2000).
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through mandatory adjudication backed up by the threat of retaliatory
trade sanctions.39
The U.N. human rights system first turned its attention to TRIPs in
2000. In August of that year, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (“Sub-Commission”)
adopted Resolution 2000/7 on “Intellectual Property Rights and
Human Rights.”40 The resolution, which was highly critical of
intellectual property protection, stated that “actual or potential
conflicts exist between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”41 These
conflicts cut across a wide swath of legal terrain, including: (1) the
transfer of technology to developing countries; (2) the consequences
for the right to food of plant breeders’ rights and patents for
genetically modified organisms; (3) biopiracy;42 (4) the protection of
the culture of indigenous communities; and (5) the impact on the
right to health of legal restrictions on access to patented
pharmaceuticals.43 To resolve these conflicts, the Sub-Commission
urged national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
civil society groups to give human rights “primacy . . . over economic
policies and agreements.”44
This assertion of normative predominance had no legal force,
however, because the Sub-Commission’s resolutions are, by their own
terms, nonbinding. Nor did the Sub-Commission parse the texts of

39

See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 2.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7], available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046
704e?Opendocument. For a discussion of the Resolution’s history, see generally
David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, A Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property
Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2003).
41
Resolution 2000/7, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 11.
42
“Biopiracy” has been loosely used to describe any act by which a commercial
entity obtains intellectual property rights over biological resources that are seen as
“belonging” to developing states or indigenous communities located within their
borders. See CEAS CONSULTANTS (WYE) LTD., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN AGRIC. STUDIES,
FINAL REPORT FOR DG TRADE EUR. COMM.: STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
AGREEMENT ON TRIPS AND BIODIVERSITY RELATED ISSUES 78 (2000).
43
Resolution 2000/7, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 11; see also id. ¶ 2 (identifying
conflicts between TRIPS and “the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to selfdetermination”).
44
Id. ¶ 3.
40
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the relevant (and binding) international agreements or the rules of
customary international law to identify which specific human rights
protections TRIPS violates.
Rather, the Resolution’s principal
objective was to propose an ambitious new agenda for reviewing
intellectual property issues within the U.N. human rights system, an
agenda animated by the basic principle of human rights primacy.45
In the more than five years since the Resolution’s adoption, the
response to the Sub-Commission’s invitation has been overwhelming.
The actions taken and documents produced by U.N. human rights
bodies are numerous and diverse. They include: (1) annual
resolutions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on “Access to
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria,” which urge states to ensure such access;46
(2) an analysis of TRIPS by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, which argues that intellectual property laws must promote
access to knowledge and innovations, opposes the adoption of TRIPSplus treaties, and emphasizes states’ obligations to provide access to
affordable medicines to treat HIV/AIDS;47 (3) a report by two Special
Rapporteurs on Globalization, which asserts that intellectual property
protection has undermined human rights objectives;48 (4) a second
resolution by the Sub-Commission that identifies a widening set of
conflicts between TRIPS and human rights, including “the rights to
self-determination, food, housing, work, health and education, and . . .
transfers of technology to developing countries”49; (5) an attempt by

45

Id.
See Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2003/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/29
(Apr. 22, 2003); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (Apr. 23, 2001); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/32, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/32 (Apr. 22, 2002); see also Human Rights Commission Calls on
States to Use TRIPS Flexibilities, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.),
Apr. 20, 2005, at 5. The first resolution, sponsored by Brazil in 2001, mandates that
states, in implementing the right to the highest attainable standard of health, “adopt
legislation or other measures, in accordance with applicable international law” to
“safeguard access” to such medications “from any limitations by third parties.”
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, supra, ¶ 3(b).
47
The High Commissioner, Report of the High Commisioner on the Impact of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶¶
10-15, 27-58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter High
Commissioner Report].
48
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights, ¶¶ 19-34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (prepared by J.
Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama) [hereinafter Globalization Report].
49
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Prot. and
46

2007]

Toward a Human Rights Framework

987

the High Commissioner for Human Rights to seek observer status with
the WTO and participate in the reviews of TRIPS;50 and (6) a report by
the U.N. Secretary General on intellectual property and human rights
based on information submitted by states, intergovernmental
organizations, and NGOs.51
Several of these documents contain trenchant critiques of TRIPS, of
TRIPS-plus treaties, and of expansive intellectual property rights more
generally. They also discuss the empirical effects of intellectual
property agreements on specific human rights, in particular the right
to health in the context of global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.52
With few exceptions, however, these studies fail to provide a detailed
textual analysis of a human rights framework for intellectual property
and how that framework interfaces with existing intellectual property
protection standards in national and international law.
III. MEDIATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
OF THE CESCR COMMITTEE
This absence of close textual scrutiny in the resolutions and reports
discussed in the previous sections of this Article is not surprising,
given that the principal areas of overlap between the two legal regimes
relate to economic, social, and cultural rights. Among human rights
law’s diverse categories, these rights are the least well-developed and
the least doctrinally prescriptive. The ICESCR — the principal
international agreement that protects these rights — is a programmatic
treaty.53 Its provisions are drafted in gradualist and ambiguous
language that requires each ratifying state to “take steps . . . to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
Promotion of Human Rights, Intellectual Property and Human Rights , Res. 2001/21,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 (Aug. 16, 2001) (identifying “actual or potential
conflicts” between human rights obligations and TRIPS, and asserting “need to clarify
the scope and meaning of several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement”).
50
See High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 68.
51
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (June 14, 2001).
52
See High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 15 (stressing need for TRIPS to
“be assessed empirically to determine the effects of the Agreement on human rights in
practice”); Globalization Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 19-34 (critiquing TRIPS and
international trade regime more generally).
53
See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW POLICY AND
PROCESS 88-93 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that ICESCR establishes programmatic and
flexible commitments that are to be achieved over time).
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progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means.”54
Only in the last decade have economic, social, and cultural rights
received sustained jurisprudential attention. The U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“the CESCR Committee” or
“the Committee”) has been the progenitor of a movement to imbue
these rights with greater prescriptive force. The Committee is a
supervisory body of eighteen human rights experts who interpret the
ICESCR and monitor its implementation by its more than 150 member
nations.55
One of the Committee’s principal functions is to provide these
nations with guidance as to the treaty’s meaning. This guidance takes
the form of nonbinding “general comments” on specific treaty articles
or specific human rights issues.56 General comments serve as focal
points for change in national legal systems and provide a standard
against which the Committee can review states’ compliance with the
Covenant. Formally, these recommended interpretations are directed
only to governments.57 But their scope is not limited to public laws or
the actions of public officials. They extend as well to individuals,
business associations, and other private parties whose conduct
implicates social, economic, and cultural rights. Although these nonstate actors have no direct human rights responsibilities under the
Covenant, governments are required to regulate their activities to
satisfy their own treaty obligations.58
The CESCR Committee’s first interpretive foray into intellectual
property occurred in the fall of 2001, when it published a “Statement
on Human Rights and Intellectual Property.”59 The statement offered
54

ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2007).
56
See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 89-92 (1995).
57
See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature
of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed
0052b664?Opendocument.; see also WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 53, at 104-07
(discussing evolution of Committee’s general comments).
58
For a thoughtful and influential analysis of these issues, see generally ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993).
59
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001)
55
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a preliminary analysis of the ICESCR’s intellectual property provisions
and their relationship to other economic and social rights in the
Covenant. It also set out a new agenda for the Committee to draft
general comments on each of the ICESCR’s intellectual property
clauses.60 In November 2005, the Committee published the first of
these general comments, an exegesis on article 15(1)(c) of the
Covenant (“General Comment”), “the right of everyone to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.”61
Taken together, the Committee’s 2001 statement and the 2005
general comment on “authors’ rights”62 provide a partial blueprint of a
human rights framework for intellectual property. In the sections that
follow, I review these two documents in detail, expanding upon that
outline and analyzing its substantive implications.
A. Introducing a “Violations Approach” to Authors’ Rights
The Committee’s General Comment reveals the challenges of
developing a coherent and detailed interpretation of article 15(1)(c)
from the Covenant’s sparse text. The draft is a lengthy, densely
worded, and somewhat repetitive document of fifty-seven paragraphs
divided into six parts: (1) an introductory section that explains the
basic’s premises of the Committee’s analysis; (2) a close textual
reading of article 15(1)(c)’s “normative content”; (3) a section
[hereinafter Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/1e1f4514f8512432c1256ba6003b2cc6/$FILE/G01
46641.pdf (follow-up to day of general discussion on article 15.1(c), Monday, 26
November 2001).
60
Id. ¶ 2.
61
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)),
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005 (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment No. 17],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/
03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$FILE/G0640060.pdf.
62
The Anglophone phrases “the rights of authors” and “authors’ rights” are
confusingly similar to, but legally distinct from, the Francophone “droit d’auteur,”
which refers to legal rights granted to authors and creators in countries that follow the
civil law tradition of protection for literary and artistic works. See generally ALAN
STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES (1993)
(comparing droit d’auteur and copyright). By contrast, the references to “authors’
rights” and similar phrases in this Article describe the legal entitlements for creators
and inventors that are recognized in international human rights law. These legal
protections are not coterminous with those of droit d’auteur.
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outlining states’ legal obligations, including general, specific, core, and
related obligations; (4) an analysis of actions or omissions that would
violate the article; (5) a section on how authors’ rights are to be
implemented at the national level; and (6) a short discussion of the
obligations of non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations.63
This organizational structure, and in particular the distinction it
creates between “legal obligations” and “violations,” is likely to
mystify domestic intellectual property lawyers. The Committee’s
methodology will, however, be familiar to foreign ministries, human
rights scholars, and NGOs who have followed the Committee’s past
efforts to provide concrete interpretations of the ICESCR’s many
ambiguous clauses. In particular, the Committee has developed a
“violations approach” to interpreting the Covenant that distinguishes
“core obligations” — minimum essential levels of each right which all
states must immediately implement — from other obligations that
may be achieved progressively as additional resources become
available.64 These core obligations include three distinct undertakings
— to respect, to protect, and to fulfill. As the Committee explains in
the General Comment on authors’ rights:
The obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain from
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the
right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests of the author. The obligation to protect requires
States parties to take measures that prevent third parties from
interfering with the moral and material interests of authors.
Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial,
promotional and other measures towards the full realization of
article 15, paragraph 1 (c).65
These three core obligations, although framed in the distinctive
language of human rights law, should, upon reflection, seem
reasonably familiar to intellectual property lawyers and scholars.
Taken seriatim, they bar states from violating authors’ material and
moral interests themselves, most notably in the form of infringements
by government agencies or officials;66 they mandate “effective
63

General Comment No. 17, supra note 61.
Id. ¶ 10; see also Audrey Chapman, Conceptualizing the Right to Health: A
Violations Approach, 65 TENN. L. REV. 389, 395 (1998).
65
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 28; see also id. ¶¶ 44-46 (discussing
actions and omissions that violate these three obligations).
66
Id. ¶¶ 30, 44.
64
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protection” of those interests in legislation, including protection of
“works which are easily accessible or reproducible through modern
communication and reproduction technologies”;67 and they require
states to provide judicial and administrative remedies for authors to
prevent unauthorized uses of their works (i.e., injunctions) and to
recover compensation for such uses (i.e., damages), and, more
broadly, to facilitate authors’ participation in and control over
decisions that affect their moral and material interests.68
These obligations also overlap with several provisions in intellectual
property treaties, most notably the Berne Convention’s reproduction
rights and moral rights clauses, the “making available” right in the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
These
Treaty, and the enforcement provisions in TRIPS.69
commonalities suggest that states can satisfy their obligations under
article 15(1)(c), at least in part, by ratifying international intellectual
property agreements and by enacting national copyright and
neighboring rights laws. The ICESCR’s state reporting procedures
strongly support this claim.70 Since the early 1990s, member nations
have regularly cited to such treaties and laws to demonstrate
compliance with the authors’ rights provisions in the Covenant.71
67

Id. ¶¶ 31, 45.
See id. ¶¶ 34, 46.
69
Berne Convention, supra note 17, arts. 6bis, 9; WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 6,
2002) [hereinafter WTC], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/
trtdocs_wo033.pdf; WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (entered into force May 20, 2002),
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf; TRIPS,
supra note 1, arts. 41-51, 61.
70
ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 16 (requiring states to submit periodic “reports on
the measures they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of
the rights recognized” in Covenant).
71
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Second Periodic Report: Jordan, ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.17,
(July 23, 1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
7eb0986e8af3f29c802567240056ca4c?Opendocument
(citing
amendments
to
Copyright Protection Act that conform to international copyright treaties and
government’s intent to ratify such treaties to demonstrate compliance with article
15(1)(c)); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Initial Report: Israel, ¶¶ 782-88, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.39(3), (Jan. 20,
1998),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
41e674c4a2affbd480256617004768f5?Opendocument (discussing evolution and
expansion of copyright legislation and ratification of numerous international
68
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Notwithstanding the commonalities between the human rights and
intellectual property regimes, the Committee’s “core obligations”
approach to authors’ rights leaves many issues unresolved. Most
notably, it does not define the content of the “moral and materials
interests” which states are required to “respect, protect, and fulfill.”72
Nor does it specify whether — and, if so, how — a human rights
framework for authors’ rights differs from the legal rules contained in
intellectual property treaties and domestic legislation. The next
section considers the Committee’s treatment of these key definitional
issues.
B. Developing a Distinctive Human Rights Framework
for Authors’ Rights
The General Comment gives detailed attention to the differences
between authors’ moral and material interests and the provisions of
intellectual property treaties and statutes. The Committee begins with
the basic and uncontroversial assertion that the “scope of protection”
of authors’ rights in article 15(1)(c) “does not necessarily coincide
with what is termed intellectual property rights under national
legislation or international agreements.”73 But what, precisely, are
these differences in scope?
The Committee first compares foundational principles. It notes that
“[h]uman rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human
person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and
foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for
inventiveness and creativity . . . for the benefit of society as a whole.”74
Because intellectual property rights are granted by the state, they may
also be taken away by the state. They are temporary, not permanent;
they may be “revoked, licensed or assigned”;75 and they may be

agreements to demonstrate compliance with article 15(1)(c)); U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third Periodic Report:
Cyprus, ¶ 420, U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.12 (June 6, 1996), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.1994.104.Add.12.En?Opendocument
(citing ratification of Berne Convention and domestic copyright legislation to
demonstrate compliance with article 15(1)(c)).
72
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 28.
73
Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 3 (“It is . . . important not to equate intellectual property
rights with the human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1(c).”).
74
Id. ¶ 1.
75
Id. ¶ 2.
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“traded, amended and even forfeited,”76 commensurate with the
regulation of a “social product [that] has a social function.”77 By
contrast, human rights are enduring, “fundamental, inalienable and
universal entitlements.”78 These statements reflect a vision of authors’
rights as human rights that exist independently of the vagaries of state
approval, recognition, or regulation.
The Committee identifies several distinctive features of authors’
rights in the Covenant. For example, article 15(1)(c) applies only to
“individuals, and under certain circumstances groups of individuals
and communities.”79 Corporations and other legal entities are
expressly excluded.80 This represents a profound departure from
Anglo American copyright laws, which have long recognized that legal
entities can enjoy the status of authors of intellectual property
products, for example, of works made for hire.81
Moreover, the protections provided to these natural persons have a
distinctive human rights flavor. Consider the issue of equality. A
cornerstone of intellectual property treaties is the “national treatment”
of foreign authors and rights owners.82 A human rights framework for
authors’ rights encompasses a rule of equality between domestic and
foreign owners of intellectual property products. But it goes much
further, including many additional prohibited grounds of
discrimination and mandating equal access to legal remedies for
infringement, including access for “disadvantaged and marginalized
groups.”83 Equality also has a process dimension, which requires
76

Id.
Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 4.
78
Id. ¶ 6.
79
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 1.
80
See id. ¶ 7 (stating that drafters of ICESCR article 15 “considered authors of
scientific, literary or artistic productions to be natural persons”); Statement on Human
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 6 (contrasting human rights
approach to authors’ rights with that of intellectual property regimes which “are
increasingly focused on protecting business and corporate interests and investments”).
81
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . .
. and . . . owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
82
See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 17-38 (1987); David Vaver, The National
Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 17 INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 577 (1986).
83
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 39(d); see also Statement on Human
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 7 (stating that “human rights
instruments place great emphasis on protection against discrimination,” and that
rights guaranteed in Covenant “must be exercised without discrimination of any kind
77
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states to provide authors with information “on the structure and
functioning of . . . legal or policy regime[s],” and to facilitate their
participation in “any significant decision-making processes with an
impact on their rights and legitimate interests,” either directly or
through “professional associations.”84
These distinctive features of a human rights conception of authors’
rights have some surprising consequences. If the moral and material
interests of authors and creators are fundamental rights, then the
ability of governments to regulate them — either to protect other
human rights or to achieve other social objectives — ought to be
exceedingly narrow. And in fact, the Committee has developed a
stringent test for assessing the legality of state restrictions on social
and economic rights,85 a standard that it reaffirms in the General
Comment on article 15(1)(c).
According to this test, government restrictions on authors’ rights
must be “[1] determined by law, [2] in a manner compatible with the
nature of these rights, [3] must pursue a legitimate aim, and [4] must
be strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a
democratic society.”86 In addition, such limitations must “be [5]
proportionate, meaning that [6] the least restrictive measures must be
adopted when several types of limitations may be imposed.”87 This
multipart test is an intellectual property owner’s dream. And it is far
more constraining than the now ubiquitous “three-step test”88 used to
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”).
84
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶¶ 18(b), 34. For an analysis of the
General Comment’s implications for government regulation of collective rights
organizations, see Laurence R. Helfer, Collective Management of Copyright and Human
Rights: An Uneasy Alliance, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS 85 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2006).
85
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art. 12), ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, (Nov. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument
(discussing government’s burden to demonstrate legality of limitations on right to
health).
86
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 22 (bracketed numbers added).
87
Id. ¶ 23 (bracketed numbers added).
88
See, e.g., WCT, supra note 69, art. 10(1) (“Contracting Parties may, in their
national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.”); TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13 (“Members shall
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
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assess the treaty-compatibility of exceptions and limitations in
national copyright and patent laws.89
Yet if restrictions on authors’ rights are to be so rigidly scrutinized
(and, presumably, so rarely upheld) how, then, are governments to
strike a balance between authors’ rights on the one hand and the
public’s interest in access to knowledge on the other?90 A close
parsing of the text offers hints of how the Committee may ultimately
construct a distinctive human rights framework for intellectual
property when it drafts general comments interpreting the remaining
rights protected by article 15, which include the right to take part in
cultural life, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications, and the freedom indispensable for scientific research and
creative activity.91
The key to understanding this framework is to identify the purposes
of recognizing authors’ moral and material interests as human rights.
According to the Committee, such rights serve two essential functions.
First, they “safeguard[] the personal link between authors and their
creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and
their collective cultural heritage.”92 And second, they protect “basic
the legitimate interests of the right holder.”); id. art. 30 (“Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
89
See generally Mihaly Ficsor, How Much of What?: The “Three-Step Test” and Its
Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, 192 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 110 (2002); Jane Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?
The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 (2001).
90
The CESCR Committee emphasizes the need for balancing throughout the
General Comment and in its 2001 Statement. See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra
note 61, ¶ 22 (“The right to the protection of the moral and materials interests
resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions is subject to limitations
and must be balanced with the other rights recognized in the Covenant . . . .”); id. ¶
35 (“States parties are . . . obliged to strike an adequate balance between their
obligations under article 15, paragraph 1(c), on one hand, and under the other
provisions of the Covenant, on the other hand, with a view to promoting and
protecting the full range of rights guaranteed in the Covenant.”); Statement on Human
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 4 (“Intellectual property rights must
be balanced with the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications”) (footnote omitted); id. ¶ 17 (“Article 15 of the
Covenant sets out the need to balance the protection of public and private interests in
knowledge.”).
91
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 4.
92
Id. ¶ 2. This “personal link” is protected by legislation that enables authors to
“be recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic productions and
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material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an
adequate standard of living.”93
These two statements, which recur throughout the General
Comment,94 suggest the existence of an irreducible core of rights — a
zone of personal autonomy in which authors can achieve their creative
potential, control their productive output, and lead independent,
intellectual lives, all of which are essential requisites for any free
society.95 Legal protections in excess of those needed to establish this
core zone of autonomy may serve other salutary social purposes. But
those additional protections are not required under article 15 of the
Covenant and, as a result, they are not subject to the restrictive test
quoted above.
Stated differently, once a country guarantees authors and creators
these two core rights — one moral, the other material — any
additional intellectual property protections the country provides “must
be balanced with the other rights recognized in the Covenant,” and
must give “due consideration” to “the public interest in enjoying
broad access to” authors’ productions.96 The ICESCR thus gives each
of its member states the discretion to eschew these additional
protections altogether or, alternatively, to shape them to the particular
economic, social, and cultural conditions within their borders.97

to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to their productions which would be prejudicial to their honour or
reputation.” Id. ¶ 40(b). The Committee’s language closely tracks the moral rights
provisions in article 6bis of the Berne Convention and in many national laws.
93
Id. ¶ 2.
94
The Committee repeats variants of the “personal link” language a total of six
times, and it reasserts the “adequate standard of living” formulation no less than nine
times — repetitions that suggest the importance of these concepts to its analysis. See
id. ¶¶ 2, 12, 15, 23, 30, 39 (personal link or similar language); id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 15, 16, 23,
30, 39, 44, 45 (adequate standard of living).
95
Cf. COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that drafters of
UDHR believed that best way to avoid recurrence of abuses of science, technology,
and copyrighted propaganda that occurred during World War II would be “to
recognize that everyone had a share in the benefits and that . . . those who made
valuable [intellectual] contributions were entitled to protection”).
96
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶¶ 22, 35; see also id. ¶ 11 (stating that
nothing in article 15.1(c) prevents states parties from “adopting higher protection
standards” in intellectual property treaties or national laws, “provided that these
standards do not unjustifiably limit the enjoyment by others of their Covenant
rights”).
97
See id. ¶ 18 (stating that “the precise application” of authors’ and inventors’
moral and material interests “will depend on the economic, social and cultural
conditions prevailing in a particular State party”).
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A human rights framework for authors’ rights is thus both more
protective and less protective than the approach endorsed by
copyright and neighboring rights regimes. It is more protective in that
rights within the core zone of autonomy are subject to a far more
stringent limitations test than the one applicable contained in
intellectual property treaties and national laws. It is also less
protective, however, in that a state need not recognize any authors’
rights lying outside of this zone or, if it does recognize such additional
rights, it must give appropriate weight to other social, economic, and
cultural rights and to the public’s interest in access to knowledge.
C. First Steps Toward a Balanced Regime of
Intellectual Property Protection
The Committee’s General Comment on article 15(1)(c) — which
focuses only the sub-paragraph of article 15 that protects the rights of
creators and inventors — offers few details of how states are to achieve
balanced, human rights-compliant rules of intellectual property
protection. Its most informative statement appears in a single
paragraph of the General Comment — paragraph 35 — which, as
described below, sets forth an interpretive principle and three specific
recommendations.98
The interpretive principle requires states to ensure that “legal and
other regimes” for the protection of intellectual property “constitute
no impediment to their ability to comply with their core obligations in
relation to the right to food, health, education culture, as well as the
right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications or any other right set out in the
Covenant.”99 On the one hand, this statement is simply an innocuous
reminder that states must reconcile all of their treaty commitments
and avoid derogating from one set of treaty rules when satisfying
another. But the reference to compliance with the ICESCR’s “core
obligations” masks a deeper structural understanding of how the
Committee believes governments should reconcile human rights and
intellectual property.
First, such a reference acknowledges, albeit indirectly, that states
may have difficulty reconciling treaty-based intellectual property
protection rules with the Covenant’s non-core obligations. These noncore obligations include the more expansive aspects of economic,
social, and cultural rights that go beyond the Covenant’s “minimum
98
99

Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
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essential levels” of protection100 and that states may permissibly
recognize over time as constrained by their limited resources. This
suggests that governments retain — at least in the near term — a fairly
broad “margin of appreciation”101 within which to reconcile human
rights guarantees, intellectual property protection rules, and other
policy objectives, and that the calibrations needed to achieve such
reconciliation may permissibly vary from one country to another.102
Second, by referencing “core obligations” — a phrase that appears
nowhere in the text of the ICESCR and is instead a product of the
Committee’s own general comment jurisprudence — the Committee
has arrogated to itself the power to determine which rights are “core”
and thus could be violated by a government’s adoption of expansive
intellectual property rules.103 The Committee has thus linked
violations of the ICESCR to an evolving legal standard that its
members will develop in future general comments identifying the core
aspects of specific Covenant rights, including the public’s right “to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.”104
In the interim, however, the Committee offers three specific
prescriptions for member states. First, it opines that states “have a
duty to prevent . . . unreasonably high costs for access to essential
medicines, plant seeds or other means or food production, or to
schoolbooks and learning materials, [from] undermin[ing] the rights

100

Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 12.
The term “margin of appreciation” refers to a doctrine of judicial deference
developed by the European Court of Human Rights. It describes “the degree of
discretion that [a human rights tribunal] is willing to grant national decision makers
who seek to fulfill their . . . obligations under [a human rights] treaty.” Laurence R.
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 404 (1998). The doctrine
provides states with “a modicum of breathing room in balancing the protection of
[specific human rights] against other pressing societal concerns.” Id. See generally
HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS
OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (analyzing doctrine’s origins and
operations).
102
See General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 47 (noting “considerable margin
of discretion” that each state possesses to determine “which measures are most
suitable to meet its specific needs,” and stating that these measures “will vary
significantly from one State to another”).
103
Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 12
(explaining that “the Committee has begun to identify the core obligations arising from
the ‘minimum essential levels in relation to the rights to health, food and education’”)
(emphasis added).
104
ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 15(1)(b).
101
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of large segments of the population to health, food and education.”105
Second, it recommends that states “prevent the use of scientific and
technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and dignity,
including the rights to life, health, and privacy,” for example “by
excluding
inventions
from
patentability
whenever
their
commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these
rights,” and by “consider[ing] to what extent the patenting of the
human body and its parts would affect their obligations under the
Covenant.”106 Finally, it urges states to “consider undertaking human
rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and after a period of
implementation of legislation for the protection of” authors’ rights.107
These detailed recommendations have uncertain consequences for
states that have ratified TRIPS and other intellectual property treaties.
Inasmuch as general comments are only nonbinding interpretations of
the ICESCR, governments could reasonably interpret the Committee’s
prescriptions as nothing more than aspirational goals. And, indeed,
the recommendations in paragraph 35 are formulated merely as
suggestions for governments to consider.
Even in this hortatory form, however, these recommendations may
produce meaningful legal and political change.108 For example, they
create opportunities for the Committee, aided by information provided
by sympathetic NGOs, to question officials about license fees and
105

General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 35. It bears noting that TRIPS already permits member states to exclude
from patentability “animals other than micro-organisms.” TRIPS, supra note 1, art.
27(3)(b).
107
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 35. An earlier draft of the general
comment included a provision recommending states “to include human rights criteria
among the requirements for the grant of patents or other intellectual property rights.”
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Draft General Comment No. 18: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c))
(Nov. 15, 2004). The Committee removed this provision from the final draft, perhaps
because of the uncertain legality of such eligibility requirements under TRIPS. See
Nuño Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and
Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement:
The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 386-89 (2000).
108
Scholars have recently emphasized the importance of nonbinding norms, or soft
law, as a method to promote international cooperation. See C.M. Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 850, 856-59 (1989) (discussing different ways in which soft law evolves into
customary international law). See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE
OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).
106
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patent eligibility rules when governments submit reports on the steps
they have taken, and the difficulties they have encountered, to
implement article 15.109 The recommendations also provide a
template for countries whose governments already oppose expansive
intellectual property protection standards to implement more human
rights-friendly standards in their national laws.110 And they may
influence the jurisprudence of WTO dispute settlement panels, which
are likely to confront arguments that TRIPS should be interpreted in a
manner that avoids conflicts with nonbinding norms and harmonizes
the objectives of the international intellectual property and
international human rights regimes.111 These changes are likely to
evolve incrementally over the course of years.
A more immediate response to the Committee’s analysis and
recommendations, however, may occur in other intergovernmental
negotiating fora. In the General Comment’s concluding section, the
Committee attempts to expand its influence and create a broader
audience for its ideas. In discussing the obligations of actors other
than states parties, the Committee declares that “as members of
international organizations such as WIPO, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and
WTO, states parties have an obligation to take whatever measures they
can to ensure that the policies and decisions of those organizations are
in conformity with their obligations under the Covenant.”112 It also
calls on these organizations, as independent actors, “to intensify their
efforts to take into account human rights principles and obligations in
their work concerning” authors’ rights.113
These entreaties are overt attempts to expand the Committee’s
distinctive human rights framework for intellectual property to other
international venues where intellectual property treaty-making and
standard-setting is underway. The next part of this Article explores

109
ICESCR, supra note 7, arts. 16-17 (setting forth reporting obligations of states
parties to ICESCR).
110
These countries may include developing countries who have proposed a new
“Development Agenda” at WIPO. See WIPO General Assembly, Document Prepared by
the Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development
Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Proposal by Argentina
and Brazil], available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/
wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the WIPO
Development Agenda, see infra Part IV.C.
111
For a prediction of how WTO dispute settlement jurists are likely to address
these arguments, see Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 77-79.
112
General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 56.
113
Id. ¶ 57.
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these developments, taking up specific lawmaking initiatives under
way or recently completed in UNESCO, the WHO, and WIPO.
IV. RECENT TREATY-MAKING IN OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS RELEVANT TO A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In the last two years, intellectual property issues have risen to the
top of the agendas of several international organizations. Work in
these venues involves not only the creation of new nonbinding norms
but, more compellingly, new international agreements.
The
approaches to intellectual property contained in these treaties, both
those that have recently been adopted and those still in draft form, are
closely aligned with the human rights framework for intellectual
property reflected in the CESCR Committee’s recent interpretive
statements. Several of these agreements expressly draw support from
human rights law. In addition, they all include provisions that are
skeptical of expansive intellectual property protection standards and
appear to conflict with the obligations in TRIPS, TRIPS-plus treaties,
and other intellectual property agreements.
A. UNESCO: The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions
On October 20, 2005, UNESCO adopted a new international
agreement, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity
of
Cultural
Expressions
(“Cultural
Diversity
Convention”).114 The Convention, which is a product of two years of
intensive negotiations by government officials and meetings of
independent experts, builds upon the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity which UNESCO’s members unanimously adopted
in 2001.115 The Convention’s birth was significantly more contentious
than that of its nonbinding parent, however. The United States in
114
See U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005
[hereinafter
Cultural
Diversity
Convention],
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf. For a brief overview of
the Convention’s drafting history and its associated documents, see UNESCO,
Convention on the Prot. and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression,
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=11281&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&
URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
115
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Res. 25, UNESCO, 31st
Gen. Conference, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res.25 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf.
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particular expressed vociferous opposition.116 Fighting a losing battle
to amend the draft treaty during the final rounds of negotiations, the
head of the U.S. delegation branded the final document as “deeply
flawed and fundamentally incompatible with [UNESCO’s] obligation
to promote the free flow of ideas,” and voted (with Israel) to oppose
its adoption by 148 other nations.117
The Cultural Diversity Convention responds to the belief shared by
many governments that the increasingly fluid movement of cultural
goods and services across national borders is endangering cultural
diversity and domestic cultural industries. A coalition of mainly
Francophone industrialized and developing countries promoted the
new treaty as a way to combat this threat and preserve their distinctive
national cultures.118 Asserting that cultural diversity is a “common
heritage of humanity,”119 the Convention reaffirms states’ “sovereign
right to formulate and implement their cultural policies and to adopt
measures to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions”
within its territory.120 A series of “guiding principles” informs how
states are to achieve this objective. These principles include refraining
116
See UNESCO Overwhelmingly Approves Cultural Diversity Treaty, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Oct. 26, 2005, at 6, 7 (describing “all-out
diplomatic offensive by Washington to modify the accord or delay its approval,
including a letter from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warning governments
that the accord would ‘sow conflict rather than cooperation’”).
117
See Julio Godoy, UNESCO Adopts Convention to Protect Diversity, INTER PRESS
SERVICE
NEWS
AGENCY,
Oct.
20,
2005,
http://www.ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=30714. The final vote on the treaty’s adoption was 148 votes in
favor, 2 against, and 4 abstentions (Australia, Honduras, Liberia, and Nicaragua). See
Press Release, Bureau of Public Information, General Conference Adopts Convention
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Oct. 20,
2005),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=
29078&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; Lawrence J. Speer,
UNESCO Culture Convention Approved, Despite Objections from United States, 22 WTO
Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 21, 2005).
118
The countries in the coalition were Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Mexico,
Monaco, Morocco, and Senegal. They were supported by the Francophone member
states of UNESCO. See Jan Wouters & Bart De Meester, UNESCO’s Convention on
Cultural Diversity and WTO Law: Complementary or Contradictory? 3 n.6 (Institute for
Int’l
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
73,
2005),
available
at
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP73e.pdf.
119
Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 2.
120
Id. art. 5(1). This sovereign right must be exercised “in conformity with the
Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and universally
recognized human rights instruments.” Id.; see also Wouters & Meester, supra note
118, at 8 (“[T]he Convention puts forward only one main right: the State’s right to
adopt measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural
expressions within its territory.”).
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from actions that “hinder respect for human rights,” such as “freedom
of expression, information and communication,” and a “principle of
openness and balance,” which seeks an accommodation between
protecting local culture and “promot[ing], in an appropriate manner,
openness to other cultures of the world.”121
A major point of contention among the treaty’s drafters was how to
define “cultural expressions,” “cultural industries,” and “cultural
activities, goods and services,”122 given the overlap among these terms
and free trade and intellectual property agreements. Ultimately, the
drafters adopted capacious definitions of these phrases,123 creating
significant conflicts with several WTO agreements. In particular, the
Cultural Diversity Convention authorizes its member states to give
preferential treatment to the production, distribution, dissemination,
and consumption of domestic cultural industries,124 a preference that
is inconsistent with the national treatment rules in GATT, GATS, and
TRIPS.125 According to some commentators these provisions are also
121

Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, arts. 2(1), (8).
Id. art. 4 (defining each of these terms).
123
See id. art. 4(3) (defining “cultural expressions” as “those expressions that
result from the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural
content”); id. art. 4(4) (defining “cultural activities, goods and services” as including
“those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are considered as a
specific attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective
of the commercial value they may have”); id. art. 4(5) (defining “cultural industries”
as “industries producing and distributing cultural goods or services as defined in
paragraph 4 above”).
124
The “measures” that states “may” adopt to protect and promote the diversity of
cultural expressions within their respective territories include, most notably, the
following:
122

[M]easures that, in an appropriate manner, provide opportunities for
domestic cultural activities, goods and services among all those available
within the national territory for their creation, production, dissemination,
distribution and enjoyment of such domestic cultural activities, goods and
services, including provisions relating to the language used for such
activities, goods and services; [and] measures aimed at providing domestic
independent cultural industries and activities in the informal sector effective
access to the means of production, dissemination and distribution of cultural
activities, goods and services.
Id. arts. 6(2)(b), 6(2)(c).
125
See Wouters & Meester, supra note 118, at 18 (identifying numerous
inconsistencies between WTO agreements and earlier version of Cultural Diversity
Convention, including provisions that appear in final text, and stating that “measures
that reserve certain space for domestic cultural goods . . . are a clear violation of the
principle of national treatment”); see also Lawrence J. Speer, U.S. Totally Isolated at
UNESCO Meeting as Cultural Diversity Treaty Gets Approved, 22 WTO Rep. (BNA)
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intended to slow the United States’ effort to negotiate bilateral trade
treaties that require developing countries to “give up their rights to
preserve and support their own unique audiovisual and information
services, including film, television and music.”126
Although early commentary on the new treaty has stressed its clash
with international trade rules, the Cultural Diversity Convention’s
relationship to intellectual property protection standards has an even
more troubled history. One might reasonably expect a treaty on
cultural diversity to contain an extensive treatment of these standards.
Remarkably, the Convention’s final text contains only a single express
reference on intellectual property — a statement of “the importance of
intellectual property rights in sustaining those involved in cultural
creativity” — which is buried near the end of a twenty-one paragraph
preamble.127 In addition, the treaty contains three citations to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights or to “universally recognized
These references highlight the
human rights instruments.”128
importance of certain rights protected by those documents, such as
“freedom of expression, information and communication,” and
“freedom of thought.”129 Yet they make no mention of the documents’
authors’ rights provisions.
The Cultural Diversity Convention’s sparse references to intellectual
property are a profound departure from earlier versions of the treaty,
most notably a March 2005 “composite text” produced by a group of
intergovernmental experts charged with writing a preliminary draft of
the Convention.130 The preamble set the tone of the composite text,
(Oct. 20, 2005) (quoting statement by U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO that “[u]nder the
provisions of the convention as drafted, any state, in the name of cultural diversity,
might invoke the ambiguous provisions of this convention to try to assert a right to
erect trade barriers to goods or services that are deemed to be cultural expressions”).
126
Godoy, supra note 117.
127
Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 17. This single
reference is especially surprising given that the Universal Declaration on Cultural
Diversity advocates the “the full implementation of cultural rights as defined in Article
27 of the [UDHR] and in Articles 13 and 15 of the [ICESCR].” Universal Declaration
on Cultural Diversity, supra note 115, art. 5.
128
Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 5, arts. 2(1), 5(1).
129
Id. at pmbl., ¶ 12, art. 2(1).
130
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Preliminary
Report of the Director-General Containing Two Preliminary Drafts of a Convention on the
Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, U.N. Doc.
CLT/CPD/2005/CONF.203/6, App. 1 (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter March 2005
Composite Text]. Intellectual property rights are also emphasized in a July 2004 draft
of the Convention:
States Parties shall also ensure:
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emphasizing “the vital role of the creative act . . . and hence the vital
role of artists and other creators, whose work needs to be endowed
with appropriate intellectual property rights.”131 This was followed, in
the draft treaty’s definitions section, with a list of the characteristics of
“cultural goods and services,” which recognized that such goods and
services “generate, or may generate, intellectual property, whether or
not they are protected under existing intellectual property
legislation.”132 The composite text also included, in unequivocal and
forceful language, an affirmative obligation to protect intellectual
property. This obligation extended to intellectual property rights
recognized in “existing international instruments to which States are
parties”133 as well as “traditional . . . cultural contents and
expressions,”134 with a particular focus on preventing piracy,
misappropriation, and “the granting of invalid intellectual property
rights.”135
Finally, in recognition of the need to harmonize the draft treaty with
preexisting treaties, the composite text included two “savings clauses”
that specified which treaty obligations were to take precedence in the
event of a conflict between agreements.136 The first clause specified
that the provisions of the draft Cultural Diversity Convention were

(a) that the legal and social status of artists and creators is fully recognized,
in conformity with international existing instruments, so that their central
role in nurturing the diversity of cultural expressions is enhanced;
(b) that intellectual property rights are fully respected and enforced
according to existing international instruments, particularly through the
development or strengthening of measures against piracy.
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Preliminary Draft
of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic
Expressions, art. 7(2), U.N. Doc. CLT/CPD/2004/CONF-201/2 (July 2004).
131
March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, pmbl., ¶ 10.
132
Id. art. 4(3).
133
Id. art. 7(3) (“[States Parties] shall ensure [intellectual property rights] are
[fully respected and enforced] according to existing international instruments to
which States are parties, particularly through the development [or strengthening] of
measures against piracy.”) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).
134
Id. art. 7(4) (“[States Parties] undertake to ensure in their territory [protection
against unwarranted appropriation] of traditional and popular [cultural contents and
expressions], [with particular regard to preventing the granting of invalid intellectual
property rights].”) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).
135
Id.
136
For a discussion of savings clauses between trade and environmental protection
agreements, see Sabrina Saffrin, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the
World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 614-18 (2002).
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subordinate to “any existing international instrument relating to
intellectual property rights” to which the Convention’s member states
were also parties.137 The second paragraph carved out a narrow
exception to this hierarchy, however, recognizing that “[t]he
provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and
obligations of any State Party deriving from any existing international
instrument, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations
would cause serious damage or threat to the diversity of cultural
expressions.”138 Inspired by a similar provision in the Convention on
Biological Diversity which has yet to be authoritatively interpreted,
this savings clause would have subordinated trade and intellectual
property obligations to those of the Cultural Diversity Convention in
the event that a member state could demonstrate such damage.139
In comparison to the March 2005 composite text, the final
Convention manifests near antipathy to intellectual property
protection standards. The drafters removed all of the clauses
described above and replaced them with far weaker commitments.140
When protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions,
member states now “may” adopt “measures aimed at nurturing and
supporting artists and others involved in the creation of cultural
expressions.”141 And they need only “endeavour to recognize the
important contribution of artists, others involved in the creative
process, cultural communities, and organizations that support their
work, and their central role in nurturing the diversity of cultural
expressions.”142 By contrast, states may also achieve the Cultural
Diversity Convention’s goals by “promot[ing] the free exchange and
circulation of . . . cultural expressions and cultural activities, goods
137

March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, art. 19, Option A, ¶ 1.
Id. art. 19, Option A, ¶ 2.
139
U.N. Environment Programme [UNEP], Convention on Biological Diversity art.
22.1, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC5/4, 31 I.L.M. 818 (“The
provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to
biological diversity.”); see also Wouters & Meester, supra note 118, at 29 (analyzing
savings clauses in March 2005 composite text).
140
The removal of these clauses appears to have occurred in early April 2005 at a
meeting of UNESCO officials and government negotiators held in Cape Town, South
Africa. See The Director General, UNESCO, Report of the Director-General on the
Progress Achieved During the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts
on the Preliminary Draft Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural
Contents and Artistic Expressions, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 172 EX/20 (Aug. 11, 2005).
141
Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, art. 6(2)(g).
142
Id. art. 7(2).
138
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and services”143 — a provision that could be read as sanctioning
promotional efforts that disregard intellectual property protection
rules required by TRIPS and other international agreements.
Finally, the savings clause contained in the Convention differs
substantially from the earlier draft described above. In place of
hierarchical rules, the clause adopts a posture of studied ambiguity.
On the one hand, it stresses the need to “foster mutual supportiveness
between th[e] Convention and other treaties” and specifies that none
of its provisions “shall be interpreted as modifying rights and
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are
parties.”144 But the savings clause also emphasizes that the Cultural
Diversity Convention is not “subordinat[e] . . . to any other treaty.”145
And it directs member states to take into account the Convention’s
provisions when “interpreting and applying the other treaties to which
they are parties or when entering into other international
obligations.”146 How states will reconcile these clauses, and whether
they will enable states to protect cultural diversity in ways that violate
trade and intellectual property agreements, cannot be determined until
after the Convention enters into force following its thirtieth
ratification.147
B. WHO: The Medical Research and Development Treaty
In February 2005, a coalition of more than 150 NGOs, public heath
experts, economists, and legal scholars called on the WHO to consider
a proposal for a Medical Research and Development Treaty
(“MRDT”).148 The treaty aims to establish a new legal framework to
promote research and development for pharmaceuticals and other
medical treatments that functions as an alternative to patents and the
monopoly drug pricing they engender. The treaty’s proponents argue
that expansive intellectual property protection rules have created
numerous problems, including restricting access to essential
medicines, costly and wasteful marketing of drugs and medical
products, and skewing investment away from innovations needed to

143
Id. art. 6(2)(e). This clause also appeared in earlier drafts of the Convention.
See March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, art. 6(2)(d).
144
Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, arts. 20(1)(a), 20(2).
145
Id. art. 20(1).
146
Id. arts. 20(1), 20(1)(b).
147
Id. art. 29 (specifying procedures for Convention’s entry into force).
148
Medical Research and Development Treaty (draft Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
MRDT], available a http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty4.pdf.
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treat diseases that afflict individuals throughout the developing
world.149
The core objectives of the MRDT include encouraging investments
in medical innovation responsive to the greatest global need, fairly
allocating the costs of such innovation among governments, and
sharing the benefits of medical innovation, including new drugs and
medical technologies, with developing countries.150
The treaty
achieves these goals by setting minimum financial obligations for
qualifying research and development based upon each nation’s gross
domestic product. Member states can meet those obligations by
funding qualifying research projects within their own borders. But
they can also fund eligible research in other countries through a
system of tradable credits that resembles the emissions trading
mechanism created for environmental agreements such as the Kyoto
Protocol.151 According to the treaty’s proponents, the result of these
provisions will be a new legal paradigm that “provide[s] the flexibility
to reconcile different policy objectives, including the promotion of
both innovation and access, consistent with human rights and the
promotion of science in the public interest.”152
The MRDT’s intellectual property provisions are both novel and
controversial. The treaty requires all member states to adopt
“minimum exceptions to patents rights for research purposes” within
five years of ratification.153 (The current draft does not specify the
content of these exceptions, however.) It also includes a commitment
to forego patent applications for a yet-to-be-specified period of time
for inventions based upon data from certain open or “public goods
databases.”154 In the area of copyright, related rights, and databases,
the treaty envisions the adoption of “a best practices model for

149
See Letter to Ask World Health Organization to Evaluate New Treaty
Framework for Medical Research and Development (Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter NGO
Letter
to
WHO],
available
at
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/
rndsignonletter.html; see also Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan Ford, The Courage to
Change the Rules: A Proposal for an Essential Health R & D Treaty, 2 PUB. LIB. SCI. MED.
96, 97-98 (2005).
150
See Andrew Jack, WHO Members Urged to Sign Kyoto-Style Treaty, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 24, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2823253; Posting by William New,
Medical R & D Treaty Debated at World Health Assembly, to Intellectual Property
Watch, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=60 (May 30, 2005, 2:01 P.M.).
151
Jack, supra note 150; New, supra note 150.
152
NGO Letter to WHO, supra note 149, at 1.
153
MRDT, supra note 148, art. 14.2.
154
Id. art. 14.1
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exceptions” in national laws.155 It does not explain, however, how
these exceptions further the treaty’s medical research goals.
To protect the MRDT’s distinctive alternative framework for medical
research and innovation, including its intellectual property provisions,
the MRDT’s proponents needed to specify the treaty’s relationship to
other international agreements. The drafters adopted a distinctive
approach to this important legal issue. Unlike other recently adopted
treaties whose provisions plausibly conflict with preexisting trade or
intellectual property agreements, the MRDT does not contain a clause
specifying its relationship to those agreements. Rather, with respect to
a defined class of medical research and development products,156 the
MRDT’s signatories agree “to forgo dispute resolution cases” that
concern (1) the TRIPS provisions protecting patents and undisclosed
test data, or (2) the “pricing of medicines.”157 They also agree to forgo
such dispute settlement, as well as sanctions, “in regional or bilateral
trade agreements or unilateral trade policies.”158 This forbearance is
not absolute, however. Rather, it applies only “in areas where
compliance with the terms of the Treaty provides an alternative and
superior framework for supporting innovation.”159
The MRDT’s future remains uncertain. A meeting of experts
attending the World Health Assembly in May 2005 debated the treaty’s
provisions and underlying philosophy, and advocates at that meeting
have proposed that the Assembly establish a committee of member
states to consider the draft treaty sometime in 2006.160
C. WIPO: The Development Agenda and Access to Knowledge Treaty
Since its creation in the late 1960s, the WIPO has engaged in a
broad array of activities consistent with its mandate of “promot[ing]

155

Id. art. 15.
The products defined as “qualified medical research and development” include:
“i. Basic biomedical research; ii. Development of biomedical databases and research
tools; iii. Development of pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, medical diagnostic tools; iv.
Medical evaluations of these products; and v. the preservation and dissemination of
traditional medical knowledge.” Id. art. 4.1.
157
Id. art. 16(d).
158
Id. arts. 16(d), 2.3.
159
Id. art. 2.3.
160
See New, supra note 150; Tim Hubbard, Reply to the Comments Requested by
CIPIH and WHO to the CPTech Proposal for a Medical Research and Development
Treaty (MRDT) (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
submissions/SubmissionsHubbard.pdf.
156
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the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.”161 To
assist member states in negotiating international agreements, the
WIPO Secretariat hosts periodic diplomatic conferences, shares
information, and provides expert advice. WIPO also provides
technical assistance and training to national governments and to their
intellectual property offices, especially in developing countries. More
recently, the organization has created standing, expert, and
intergovernmental committees which examine specific intellectual
property topics and create nonbinding guidelines and
recommendations (so-called “soft law”).162
Over the last decade, WIPO and its member states have been
exceptionally active in negotiating new intellectual property treaties
relating to copyrights, patents, and trademarks and in undertaking an
ambitious program of soft lawmaking. Although these activities have
generated new intellectual property protection standards, those
standards have not exclusively favored the interests of industrialized
countries. Although some initiatives have benefited states with wellresourced and influential intellectual property industries, developing
countries have retained considerable influence in the organization to
shape treaty obligations and soft law norms.163
Two years ago, however, the political winds shifted in favor of
governments and civil society groups seeking to refocus WIPO’s
mandate away from generating new intellectual property protection
standards and toward economic development and non-proprietary
approaches to promoting human innovation and creativity. In
October 2004, the WIPO General Assembly adopted a proposal from
Argentina and Brazil to establish a new Development Agenda for the
organization.164 This proposal reflected collaboration among likeminded developing countries (known as the “Friends of
Development”)165 and civil society groups, the latter of which issued
161
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO]
art. 3(i), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979).
162
See Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World Intellectual
Property Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 192 (2002) (discussing
resolutions and recommendations that comprise “the new ‘soft law initiative’ at
WIPO”).
163
For a more detailed discussion of these trends, see Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra
note 2, at 25-26.
164
See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], General Assembly, Report of the
Twenty-First (15th Extraordinary) Session, ¶ 218, WO/GA/31/15 (Oct. 5, 2004),
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/wipo10042004.html; WIPO, Proposal by
Argentina and Brazil, supra note 110.
165
The Friends of Development are comprised of the following countries:
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the “Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO” prior to the General
Assembly meeting.166
The Geneva Declaration was a brilliant example of using core
institutional principles to foment institutional reform. Although the
convention establishing WIPO speaks of promoting intellectual
property protection on a global basis, there is authority for
interpreting the organization’s mandate much more capaciously. In
1974 WIPO entered into an agreement designating it as a specialized
agency of the United Nations.167 Adopted during a period when
pressure by newly independent developing countries for a New
International Economic Order was at its zenith,168 the agreement states
that WIPO is responsible for “promoting creative intellectual activity
and facilitating the transfer of technology . . . to developing countries
in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development.”169
The Geneva Declaration’s drafters seized upon this long-forgotten
treaty language to articulate a revised mission for WIPO. Proceeding
from the premise that “[h]umanity faces a global crisis in the
governance of knowledge, technology and culture,”170 the Geneva
Declaration demands that WIPO eschew additional expansions of
monopoly privileges.171 Instead, it urges the organization to devote
greater attention to issues such as (1) the social and economic costs of
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya,
Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Venezuela. See WIPO, Inter-Sessional
Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, 1st Sess., Proposal to
Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document
WO/GA/31/11, Annex at 2, IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005).
166
Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Geneva Declaration], available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf.
167
Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property
Organization art. 1, Dec. 17, 1974, [hereinafter UN-WIPO Agreement], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/un_wipo_agreement.pdf.
168
As Peter Yu has stated, “The New International Economic Order sought to bring
about fundamental changes in the international economic system by redistributing
power, wealth, and resources from the developed North to the less developed South.”
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 409 n.392 (2004) (citing Declaration on the Establishment of
a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, at 527, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special
Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)).
169
UN-WIPO Agreement, supra note 167, art. 1.
170
Geneva Declaration, supra note 166, at 1.
171
Id. at 2 (“‘A one size fits all’ approach that embraces the highest levels of
intellectual property protection for everyone leads to unjust and burdensome
outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet the most basic needs of their
citizens.”).
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intellectual property protection, (2) reforms of existing intellectual
property rules, and (3) non-proprietary systems of creativity and
innovation, such as “Wikipedia, the Creative Commons, GNU Linux
and other free and open software projects, as well as distance
education tools and medical research tools.”172
Among the many items on the Development Agenda is a proposal
for a Treaty on Access to Knowledge (colloquially referred to as the
“A2K Treaty”).173 Although the A2K Treaty has recently received the
backing of influential developing countries such as Brazil and India, its
origins are firmly rooted in civil society. In fact, the treaty’s genesis
resembles the decentralized, open source collaboration models that its
text endorses. A diverse group of NGOs, whose members include
medical researchers, educators, archivists, disabled people, and
librarians from industrialized and developing nations, drafted and
circulated numerous suggestions for provisions to be included in the
treaty.174 In February 2005, representatives of these groups met in
Geneva to discuss the proposals and to hammer out a comprehensive
text.175
The current draft of the A2K Treaty bears the telltale fingerprints of
multiple authors with diverse (if not divergent) interests. It includes a
dozen articles on limitations and exceptions to copyright and related
rights, provisions on patent protection aimed at “expanding and
enhancing the knowledge commons,” measures to promote open
standards and control anticompetitive practices, and a hodge podge of

172
Id. at 1. For more detailed discussions of the objectives of the Development
Agenda’s proponents, see generally Humanizing Intellectual Property: Developing
Countries Launch New Initiative, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, Nov.-Dec. 2004), available
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/focus.htm (describing different components of
Development Agenda); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual
Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, available at www.law.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/2004dltr0009.html (arguing that WIPO must reverse “maximalist rights
culture” that international intellectual property regime currently embodies and that is
detrimental to global development).
173
Treaty on Access to Knowledge (May 9, 2005) (draft) [hereinafter A2K Treaty],
available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf.
174
For a list of supporting civil society organizations, see IP Justice, NGO Group
Statement
Supporting
the
Friends
of
Development
Proposal,
http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/NGO_Statement.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
Proposals for inclusion in the A2K Treaty circulated through an “A2K” listerv.
CPTech.org, A2K Listserv, http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/a2k.
175
See Posting of William New, Experts Debate Access to Knowledge, to Intellectual
Property
Watch,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=19&res=
1024&print=0 (Feb. 15, 2005, 10:24 P.M.).
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miscellaneous and unfinished clauses on technology transfer,
copyright collecting societies, and financial obligations.176
Several common threads connect these varied provisions. First,
according to observers at the Geneva meeting, the treaty’s proponents
strongly support the view that “access to knowledge is a basic human
right, and that restrictions on access ought to be the exception, not the
other way around.”177 Although the draft text does not expressly
mention human rights nor cite to the ICESCR or the UDHR, many of
its provisions echo the human rights framework for intellectual
property described in this Article. For example, the treaty’s preamble
highlights the need for a balanced regime of protection, emphasizing
both the importance of “protecting and supporting the interests of
creative individuals and communities” and “enhanc[ing] participation
in cultural, civic and educational affairs, and sharing of the benefits of
scientific advancement.”178
A second thematic link among the A2K Treaty’s diverse clauses is
that both subject matter exclusions from, and exceptions and
limitations to, intellectual property protection standards are
mandatory rather than permissive. In the area of inventions, for
example, the treaty contains a lengthy list of exclusions from
patentable subject matter, including, most controversially, computer
programs and business methods.179 With respect to copyright, the
treaty states that “[f]acts and works lacking in creativity, should not
be subject to copyright or copyrightlike protections,”180 a rule that
appears to preclude sui generis protection for unoriginal databases. It
also contains a lengthy list of exceptions and limitations, which (in the
case of copyrighted works) are presumed to satisfy the “three-step
test” for such restrictions set out in TRIPS.181
The A2K Treaty’s subject matter exclusions and its exceptions and
limitations parallel similar provisions found in some — but by no
means all — national laws. For states that ratify the A2K Treaty,
however, these exceptions will become compulsory. The treaty thus

176

A2K Treaty, supra note 173, at 1-2 (listing various treaty provisions).
New, supra note 175.
178
A2K Treaty, supra note 173, pmbl., paras. 1, 4.
179
Id. art. 4.1(c) (stating that “patent rights shall not be granted for, inter alia,
“programs for computers,” “presentations of information,” and “methods of teaching
and education”).
180
Id. art. 3.7.
181
Id. art. 3.1(a); see Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 17-19 (discussing three-step test
for TRIPS-compatibility of exceptions and limitations to copyright and patent
protection).
177
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endorses maximum standards of intellectual property protection to
counterbalance the “minimum standards” approach that intellectual
property agreements have followed for more than a century.182
Under this “minimum standards” approach, multilateral intellectual
property treaties establish a floor of protection. But nothing in the
treaties prevents governments from enacting more expansive
intellectual property rules in their domestic laws or from entering into
subsequent agreements that achieve the same result. Indeed, the
treaties expressly contemplate that governments may gravitate toward
such higher standards.183 By placing a mandatory ceiling on how high
these standards can rise, the proponents of the A2K Treaty are
attempting to counteract the upward drift of intellectual property rules
that has accelerated over the past few decades and to establish a
balance regime of protection that is fully consistent with a human
rights framework for intellectual property.
CONCLUSION
The creation of a human rights framework for intellectual property
is still in an early stage of development. During this gestational
period, government officials, international jurists, NGOs, and
commentators — many of whom have divergent views concerning the
appropriate relationship between human rights and intellectual
property — have a window of opportunity to influence the
framework’s substantive content and the procedural rules that mediate
relationships among its component parts. In this conclusion, I briefly
sketch three hypothetical futures for the framework and explain why
each of these predictions is both plausible and likely to be contested
by states and non-state actors.

182
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1 (“Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement.”); see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW.
345, 351 (1995).
183
See, e.g., Berne Convention supra note 17, art. 19 (“The provisions of this
Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater
protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the Union.”); Paris
Convention, supra note 16, art. 19 (“It is understood that the countries of the Union
reserve the right to make separately between themselves special agreements for the
protection of industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the
provisions of this Convention.”).
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A. Using Human Rights to Expand Intellectual Property
One possible future relationship between human rights and
intellectual property is an expansion of intellectual property
protection standards at the expense of other human rights and the
interests of licensees, users, and consumers. In this vision of the
future (a dystopian one, to be sure), industries and interest groups
that rely upon intellectual property for their economic well-being
would invoke the authors’ rights and property rights provisions in
human rights treaties to further augment existing standards of
protection. The fear of such expansions helps to explain why some
commentators are skeptical of attempts to analyze intellectual
property issues in human rights terms.184
Early intimations of this version of the framework’s future are
already apparent. The authors’ rights clauses of the UDHR and
ICESCR share a close affinity with the natural rights tradition of droit
d’auteur prominent in civil law jurisdictions.185 Constitutional courts
in several European countries have recently relied on fundamental
rights guarantees in their respective domestic constitutions to justify
intellectual property protection.186 It would be but a short step for
these courts to turn to international human rights law to enhance this
protection still further.187
Whether these expansionist tendencies take root or not may depend
upon the outcome of a dispute pending before the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”), the international tribunal charged with
adjudicating complaints under the European Convention on Human

184
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2853 (2006); Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International
Intellectual Property Law, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1031-32 (2007).
185
See STROWEL, supra note 62, at 290-321.
186
See, e.g., Joseph Straus, Design Protection for Spare Parts Gone in Europe?
Proposed Changes to the EC Directive: The Commission’s Mandate and Its Doubtful
Extension, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rev. 391, 298 (2005) (discussing 2000 decision of
German Constitutional Court which held that patents constitute property under
article 14 of German Basic Law); Thomas Crampton, Apple Gets French Support in
Music Compatibility Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C7 (discussing ruling of French
Constitutional Council, country’s highest judicial body, which “declared major
aspects of the so-called iPod law unconstitutional”; court’s decision “made frequent
reference to the 1789 Declaration on Human Rights and concluded that the law
violated the constitutional protections of property”).
187
For an insightful discussion of these issues, see Christophe Geiger,
“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on
Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 371,
382-85 (2006).
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Rights (“European Convention”) and its Protocols.188 In AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Portugal, a decision issued in late 2005,189 the ECHR
concluded that registered trademarks are protected by the property
rights clause of the European Convention’s first Protocol.190 Using
forceful and unequivocal language, the ECHR stated that “intellectual
property as such incontestably enjoys the protection of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.”191 On the facts presented, however, a majority of the
ECHR found no violation of the right to property because the
American brewer’s trademark application was contested by a rival
Czech beer distributor whose products were protected by a registered
geographical indication.192 Given the importance of these issues, the
ECHR referred the case to a Grand Chamber for re-argument in
2006.193 The Grand Chamber held that the right to property includes
intellectual property as well as applications to register trademarks. On
the unique facts presented, however, it concluded that the government
had not violated article 1.194 The Grand Chamber thus left unresolved

188
See generally European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr
(last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
189
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 10,
2005),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=787908&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=113
2746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149.
190
See id. paras. 43-49; see also Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952,
213 U.N.T.S. 262, 262 [hereinafter Article 1] (“Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”).
191
Anheuser-Busch, App. No. 73049/01, para. 43.
192
Id. paras. 50-52.
193
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
Hearing Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal (June 28, 2006), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/D/Kommunikation_und_politische_Forschung/Presse_und_Onli
ne_Info/Presseinfos/2006/20060628-381-GH-Portugal.asp. Review by this panel of 17
judges is reserved for disputes which involve “a serious question affecting the
interpretation or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious
issue of general importance.” Id.
194
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶¶ 72, 79-87 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Grand Chamber Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&ke
y=60433&sessionId=11419720&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
Article
1
expressly authorizes governments to regulate private property in the public interest.
Article 1, supra note 190, at 262 (“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest . . . .”). It does not,
however, specify how the ECHR is to assess the legality of such regulations.
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the more difficult issue of when governments may regulate or restrict
intellectual property in the public interest.
B. Using Human Rights to Impose External Limits on
Intellectual Property
Patent, trademark, and copyright owners who invoke the property
rights and authors’ rights provisions of human rights law to demand
additional legal protections will likely face stiff resistance from user
groups. These groups can draw upon other fundamental rights and
freedoms to press for a competing version of the framework, one that
relies on human rights law to restrict intellectual property.
National courts in Europe are using the right to freedom of
expression protected by the European Convention for precisely this
purpose.195 “In particular, there have been a number of decisions in
the field of copyright in which the freedom of expression has been
invoked to justify a use that is not covered by an exception provided
for in the law.”196 These decisions rely on human rights law to
overcome the “malfunctions” of the intellectual property system, using
them as a “corrective when [intellectual property] rights are used
excessively and contrary to their functions.”197 In effect, these cases
reach beyond intellectual property’s own safety valves — such as fair
use, fair dealing, and other exceptions and limitations — to impose
external limits, or maximum standards of protection, upon rights
holders.198
How might user groups increase the likelihood that national courts
will invoke human rights law to constrain intellectual property in this
way? One plausible method would be to extend the strategy described
in Part IV of this Article to other international lawmaking venues.199

195

See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in
TORREMANS, supra note 6, at 37, 52-61; Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, Equilibrer
la liberté d’expression et le droit d’auteur: A propos des libertés de créer et d’user des
oeuvres, in DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION 1 (Alain Strowel & François
Tulkens eds., 2006).
196
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 277
(2004).
197
Id. at 278.
198
See Birnhack, supra note 195, at 61-62; Geiger, supra note 196, at 270-80.
199
See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 58 (describing strategy whereby
states and non-state actors shifted lawmaking initiatives into biodiversity, plant
genetic resources, public health, and human rights regimes as way to create
“counterregime intellectual property norms” in tension with TRIPS).
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Increasing the number of new treaties and soft law standards that
contain precise, subject-specific limits on intellectual property
improves the odds that domestic judges will refer to those limits when
resolving the disputes that come before them. Such an approach also
creates “strategic inconsistency” that increases pressure on
government representatives in other international organizations to
acknowledge these new rules and standards.200
This tactic has considerable risks, however. The international legal
system is disaggregated and decentralized and lacks the
comprehensive normative hierarchies and enforcements mechanisms
found in national laws.201 A surfeit of conflicting rules will further
diminish the system’s coherence. This could make international rules
less amenable to incorporation into national law, especially for judges
unsure of their authority to construe domestic statutes in harmony
with those rules.
C. Achieving Human Rights Ends Through Intellectual Property Means
The two future frameworks described above share a common
strategy. They each take the existing baseline of intellectual property
protection as a given and then invoke human rights law to bolster
arguments for moving that baseline in one direction or the other.
A third human rights framework for intellectual property proceeds
from a very different premise. It first specifies the minimum outcomes
— in terms of health, poverty, education, and so forth — that human
rights law requires of states. The framework next works backwards to
identify different mechanisms available to states to achieve those
outcomes. Intellectual property plays only a secondary role in this
version of the framework. Where intellectual property laws help to
achieve human rights outcomes, governments should embrace it.
Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should be modified (but
not necessarily restricted, as I indicate below). But the focus remains
on the minimum levels of human well-being that states must provide,
using either appropriate intellectual property rules or other means.
A 2001 report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
analyzing the impact of TRIPS on the right to health exemplifies this

200
Kal Raustalia & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 301-02 (2004); see also Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra
note 2, at 60 (describing efforts by developing countries to integrate “principles,
norms, and rules generated in other regimes into the WTO and WIPO”).
201
See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System,
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 205-06 (2003).
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outcome-focused, inductive approach.202 The report reviews the
components of the right to health protected by article 12 of the
ICESCR.203 According to a general comment issued by the CESCR
Committee, the right to health includes an obligation for states to
promote medical research and to provide access to affordable
treatments, including essential drugs.204
The High Commissioner’s report analyzes how intellectual property
affects these two obligations. It acknowledges that patents help
governments promote medical research by providing an incentive to
invent new medical technologies, including new drugs. But the report
also asserts that pharmaceutical companies’ “commercial motivation . .
. means that research is directed, first and foremost, towards
‘profitable’ disease. Diseases that predominantly affect people in
poorer countries . . . remain relatively under-researched.”205 One way
to remedy this market imperfection is to create incentives for
innovation outside of the patent system.206
A similar perspective informs the High Commissioner’s discussion
of access to essential medicines. The report states that patent
protection decreases the affordability of drugs. But affordability also
depends on factors unrelated to intellectual property, “such as the
level of import duties, taxes, and local market approval costs.”207 In
light of these dual impediments, governments can improve access to
patented pharmaceuticals in two ways. First, they can exploit the
flexibilities already embedded in TRIPS, such as issuing compulsory
licenses to manufacturer generic drugs and importing cheaper drugs
from other countries.208 Second, they can adopt affordabilityenhancing mechanisms outside of the intellectual property system, for
example through differential pricing, “the exchange of price
information, price competition and price negotiation with public
procurement and insurance schemes.”209 Strikingly, the efficacy of

202

High Commissioner Report, supra note 47.
ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 12.
204
High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 30.
205
Id. ¶ 37.
206
See id. ¶¶ 37-38. One such alternative would be to establish “fixed monetary
prizes for the first inventor to come up with an effective treatment for a medical
indication” that was under-researched in the patent system. Keith E. Maskus,
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J.
563, 578 (2002) (reviewing and critiquing such proposals).
207
High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 43.
208
Id. ¶¶ 47-49.
209
Id. ¶ 46.
203
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these mechanisms may require augmenting existing intellectual
property protection rules, such as negotiating “drug licensing
agreements with geographical restrictions[,] . . . so that cheaper drugs
do not leak back to wealthier markets.”210
It is too early to predict which of these three versions of the human
rights framework for intellectual property, or others yet to be
identified, will emerge as dominant. What is certain is that the rules,
institutions, and discourse of international human rights are now
increasingly relevant to intellectual property law and policy and that
the two fields, once isolated from each other, are becoming ever more
intertwined.

210
Id. ¶ 47; see also id. ¶ 50 (emphasizing need for rules to ensure that “trademarks
are not counterfeited” so that consumers and medical professionals can “identify the
source and quality of pharmaceuticals”).

